International capital mobility and exchange rate volatility by Jeffrey A. Frankel
Interaatianal Capital Mobility
and Exchange Rate Valatility
Jeffrey A. Frankel*
Three post-1980 developments have instilled in many observers a
feeling that all is not quite right with the world financial system: the
international debt problem of many developing countries, the large U.S.
current account deficit and the corresponding cumulation of foreign
indebtedness, and the heightened volatility of exchange rates and other
asset prices in world financial markets. To what extent are the large
swings in prices and quantities on international financial markets
attributable to a higher degree of international capital mobility in the
1980s? This paper examines, first, various ways of quantifying the
degree of international capital mobility, and, second, implications of
high capital mobility for the possibility that exchange rates are "exces-
sively volatile."
Has the Degree of Capital Mobility Increased?
By the second half of the 1970s, international economists had come
to speak of the world financial system as characterized by perfect capital
mobility. In many ways, this was "jumping the gun." It is true that
financial integration had been greatly enhanced after 1973 by the
removal of capital controls on the part of the United States, Germany,
Canada, Switzerland and the Netherlands; by the steady process of
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technical and institutional innovation, particularly in the Euromarkets;
and by the recycling of OPEC surpluses to developing countries. But
almost all developing countries retained extensive restrictions on inter-
national capital flows, notwithstanding the abortive liberalization exper-
iments in the Southern Cone of Latin America, as did a majority of
industrialized countries. Even among the five major countries without
capital controls, capital was not perfectly mobile by some definitions.
At least four distinct definitions of perfect capital mobility are in
widespread use. (I) The Feldstein-Horioka definition: Exogenous changes in
national saving (that is, in either private savings or government bud-
gets) can be easily financed by borrowing from abroad, and thus need
not crowd out investment in the originating country (except perhaps to
the extent that the country is large in world financial markets). (II) Real
interest parity: International capital flows equalize real interest rates
across countries. (III) Uncovered interest parity: Capital flows equalize
expected rates of return on countries’ bonds, despite exposure to
exchange risk. (IV) Closed interest parity: Capital flows equalize interest
rates across countries when contracted in a common currency. These
four possible definitions are in ascending order of specificity. Only the
last condition is an unalloyed criterion for capital mobility in the sense of
the degree of financial market integration across national boundaries.1
As we will see, each of the first three conditions, if it is to hold,
requires an auxiliary assumption in addition to the condition that
follows it. Uncovered interest parity requires not only closed (or
covered) interest parity, but also the condition that the exchange risk
premium is zero. Real interest parity requires not only uncovered
interest parity, but also the condition that expected real depreciation is
zero. The Feldstein-Horioka condition requires not only real interest
parity, but also a certain condition on the determinants of investment.
But even though the relevance to the degree of integration of financial
markets decreases as auxiliary conditions are added, the relevance to
questions regarding the origin of international payments imbalances
increases. We begin our consideration of the various criteria of capital
mobility with the Feldstein-Horioka definition.
Savingqnvestment Tests
The Feldstein-Horioka definition requires that the country’s real
interest rate be tied to the world real interest rate by criterion (II); it is,
1 There is a fifth possible--yet more narrowly defined--criterion for the degree of
integration of financial markets: the size of transactions costs as measured directly by the
bid-ask spread in, for example, the foreign exchange market. Surprisingly, the covered
interest differential does not appear to be statistically related to the bid-ask spread
(MacArthur 1988).164 Jeffrey A. Frankel
after all, the real interest rate rather than the nominal on which saving
and investment in theory depend. But for criterion (I) to hold, it is also
necessary that any and all determinants of a country’s rate of investment
other than its real interest rate be uncorrelated with its rate of national
saving. Let the investment rate be given by
(I/Y)i = a - bri + Ui, (1)
where I is the level of capital formation, Y is national output, r’is the
domestic real interest rate, and u represents all other factors, whether
measurable or not, that determine the rate of investment. Feldstein and
Horioka (1980) regressed the investment rate against the national saving
rate,
(I/Y)i = A + B(NS/Y)i + vi, (1’)
where NS is private saving minus the budget deficit. To get the zero
coefficient B that they were looking for requires not only real interest
parity:
ri -- r* = 0, (2)
(with the world interest rate r* exogenous or in any other way uncorre-
lated with (NS/Y)i), but also a zero correlation between ui and (NS/Y)i.
The Feldstein-Horioka literature. The Feldstein and Horioka finding
that the coefficient B is in fact closer to 1 than to zero has been
reproduced many times. Most authors have not been willing, however,
to follow them in drawing the inference that financial markets are not
highly integrated. There have been many econometric critiques, falling
into two general categories.
Most commonly made is the point that national saving is endoge-
nous, or in our terms is correlated with ui. This will be the case if
national saving and investment are both procyclical, as they are in fact
known to be. It will also be the case if governments respond endoge-
nously to incipient current account imbalances with policies to change
public (or private) saving in such a way as to reduce the imbalances. This
"policy reaction" argument has been made by Fieleke (1982), Tobin
(1983), Westphal (1983), Caprio and Howard (1984) and Summers
(1988). But Feldstein and Horioka made an effort to handle the econo-
metric endogeneity of national saving, more so than have some of their
critics. To handle the cyclical endogeneity, they computed averages over
a long enough period of time that business cycles could be argued to
wash out. To handle other sources of endogeneity, they used demo-
graphic variables as instrumental variables for the saving rate.
The other econometric critique is that if the domestic country is
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(NS/Y)i, and therefore even if r=r*, r and in turn (I/Y)i will be correlated
with (NS/Y)i. In other words, a shortfall in domestic savings will drive
up the world interest rate, and thus crowd out investment in the
domestic country as well as abroad. This "large-country" argument has
been made by Murphy (1984), Harberger (1980), Tobin (1983)and
Obstfeld (1986a). An insufficiently appreciated point is that the large-
country argument does not create a problem in cross-section studies,
because all countries share the same world interest rate r*. Since r*
simply goes into the constant term in a cross-section regression, it
cannot be the source of any correlation with the right-hand-side vari-
able. The large-country problem cannot explain why the countries that
are high-saving relative to the average tend to coincide with the
countries that are high-investing relative to the average.2
If the regressions of saving and investment rates were a good test
for barriers to financial market integration, one would expect to see the
coefficient falling over time. Until now, the evidence has if anything
showed the coefficient rising over time rather than falling. This finding
has emerged both from cross-section studies, which typically report
pre-and post-1973 results Feldstein (1983), Penati and Dooley (1984),
and Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987)--and from pure time-series
studies--Obstfeld (1986a,b)3 and Frankel (1986) for the United States.
The econometric endogeneity of national saving does not appear to be
the explanation for this finding, because it holds equally well when
instrumental variables are used.4
The easy explanation for the finding is that, econometric problems
aside, real interest parity--criterion (II) above---has not held ’any better
in recent years than it did in the past. Mishkin (1984a, p. 1352), for
example, found even more significant rejections of real interest parity
among major industrialized countries for the floating rate period after
2 Even in a time-series regression for a single country such as the United States, one
can correct for the large-country problem by expressing saving and investment rates as
deviations from the rest-of-world rates of saving and investment, respectively. Under the
null hypothesis, an exogenous fall in the U.S. saving rate may drive up the world real
interest rate and crowd out investment, but there is no evident reason for the crowding-
out to be reflected in U.S. investment to any greater extent than in rest-of-the-world
investment. In Frankel (1986, pp. 44-45), I found that the close correspondence between
U.S. saving and investment for 1970-85 remains, even with this adjustment.
~ Obstfeld (1986a) finds that the coefficient fell after 1973, in time series correlations for
most of his countries, but Obstfeld (1986b) finds that it has risen over time (1967-84 vs.
1956-66), with the United States showing the highest correlation of any.
a In a U.S. time series context, Frankel (1986) used two instrumental variables: the
fraction of the population over 65 years of age and the ratio of military expenditure to
GNP. The former is considered a determinant of private saving and the latter of public
saving, and both have some claim to exogeneity. In the context of cross-sections of
developing and industrialized countries, Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987) used the
dependency ratio and, again, the military expenditure variable.166 ]effrey A. Frankel
1973:II than he did for his entire 1967:II-1979:II sample period. Cara-
mazza et al. (1986, pp. 43-47) also found that some of the major
industrialized countries in the 1980s (1980:1 to 1985:6) moved farther
from real interest parity than they had been in the 1970s (1973:7 to
1979:12).5 In the early 1980s, the real interest rate in the United States, in
particular, rose far above the real interest rate of its major trading
partners, by any of a variety of measures.6 If the domestic real interest
rate is not tied to the foreign real interest rate, then there is no reason to
expect a zero coefficient in the saving-investment regression. We discuss
in a later section the factors underlying real interest differentials.
The U.S. saving-investment regression updated. Since 1980 the massive
fiscal experiment carried out under the Reagan administration has been
rapidly undermining the statistical finding of a high saving-investment
correlation for the case of the United States. The increase in the
structural budget deficit, which was neither accommodated by mone-
tary policy nor financed by an increase in private saving, reduced the
national saving rate by 3 percent of GNP, relative to the 1970s. The
investment rate--which at first, like the saving rate, fell in the 1981-82
recession had by 1987 at best only reattained its 1980 level.7 The saving
shortfall was made up, necessarily, by a flood of borrowing from abroad
equal to more than 3 percent of GNP. Hence the current account deficit
of $161 billion in 1987 (actually 3.6 percent of GNP). (By contrast, the
U.S. current account balance was on average equal to zero in the 1970s.)
By now, the divergence between U.S. national saving and invest-
ment has been sufficiently large and long-lasting to show up in longer-
term regressions of the Feldstein-Horioka type. If one seeks to isolate
the degree of capital mobility or crowding out for the United States in
particular, and how it has changed over time, then time series regres-
sion is necessary (whereas if one is concerned with such measures
worldwide, then cross-section regressions of the sort performed by
Feldstein and Horioka are better). Table i reports instrumental variables
regressions of investment against national saving for the United States
s Other studies that reject real interest p.arity for major industrialized countries
include Mishkin (1984a, 1984b), Cumby and Obs~feld (1984), Mark (1985), and Cumby and
Mishkin (1986). Glick (1987) examines real interest differentials for six Pacific Basin
countries vis-a-vis the United States.
6 The 10-year interest differential vis-a-vis a weighted average of G-5 countries was
about 3 percent in 1984, whether expected inflation is measured by a distributed lag, by
OECD forecasts, or by DRI forecasts. In 1980 the differential was about -2 percent by
contrast (Frankel 1986, pp. 35--36).
7 Gross investment was 16.0 percent of GNP in 1980, down from 16.5 percent in
1971-80, which was itself considered a low number. Net investment was 5.4 percent of
GNP, down from 6.2 percent in the 1970s.INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 167
Table 1
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against National Saving,
Decades 1869-1987
Time
Trend in Durbin-Watson Autoregressive
Constant Coefficient Coefficient Statistic Parameter R2
1. .411 .976 1.45 .96
(1,340) (.086)
2, 3.324 .785 ,46 .97
(1.842) (.118) (.33)
3. 3.291 .854 -.011 ,73 .92
(6.176) (.279) (,021)
4. 1.061 ,924 .001 ,03 .96
(1.507) (.093) (.005) (.08)
Source: Frankel (1989).
from 1870 to 1987.8 Decade averages are used for each variable, which
removes some of the cyclical variation but gives us only 12 observations.
(Yearly data are not available before 1930.) That is one more observation
than was available in Frankel (1986, Table 2.2), which went only through
the 1970s.
As before, the coefficient is statistically greater than zero and is not
statistically different from 1, suggesting a high degree of crowding out
(or a low degree of capital mobility, in Feldstein and Horioka’s terms).
But the point estimate of the coefficient (when correcting for possible
serial correlation) drops from 0.91 in the earlier study to 0.79. We can
allow for a time trend in the coefficient; it drops from plus 0.01 a year in
the earlier study to minus 0.01 a year (or plus 0.001, when correcting for
serial correlation) in the longer sample. Thus the additional years
1980-87 do show up as anticipated, as exhibiting a lower U.S. degree of
crowding out, even though the change is small. (The trend is not
statistically significant, but this is not surprising given the small number
of observations.)
A data set that begins later would seem more promising than the
12-decade averages. Table 2 reports regressions for yearly data begin-
ning in 1930. Much of the variation in the yearly data is cyclical, so table
3 uses saving and investment rates that have been cyclically adjusted,
for a sample period that begins in 1955. (The cyclical adjustment of each
8 The instrumental variables used are the dependency ratio (the sum of those older
than 64 and those younger than 21, divided by the working-age population in between),
which is a determinant of private saving, and military expenditure as a share of GNP,
which is a determinant of the federal budget deficit. A data appendix is available in the
working paper versions of Frankel (1989) for details on these and the other variables.168 ~ Jeffrey A. Frankel
Table 2
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against National Saving,
1929-1987
Durbin-Watson Autoregressive
Constant Coefficient Statistic Parameter R2
1929-87       2.99 .79 .64 .94
(.88) (.06)
1930-87 4.85 .67 .77 .89
(2.61) (.19) (,09)
1929-79 1.89 ,86 1.31 ,97
(,61) (.04)
1930-79       2.00 .85 .38 ,95
(.66) (.05) (,13)
1980-87 13.73 .15 2.09 .17
(3,85) (.27)
1981-87 -.36 .03 -.37 .00
(.56) (.02) Not Converged
Source: Frankel (1989).
is accomplished by first regressing it on the GNP gap, defined as the
percentage deviation from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
"middle expansion trend" of GNP, and taking the residuals.)
In previous work with a sample period of 1956-84, the coefficient in
a regression of cyclically adjusted saving and investment rates was
estimated at 0.80, statistically indistinguishable from 1 (Frankel 1986,
pp. 43-44). But now the coefficient has dropped essentially to zero,
suggesting a zero degree of crowding out (or, in the Feldstein-Horioka
terminology, perfect capital mobility). This finding is the result of the
addition to the sample of another three years of record current account
deficits, 1985-87, a period also in which the cyclically adjusted national
saving rate was historically low. When the equation is estimated with an
allowance for a time trend in the coefficient, the trend is negative
(though statistically insignificant), whereas the earlier sample that
stopped in 1984 showed a time trend that was positive (and insignifi-
cant).
To verify that the 1980s experience is indeed the source of the
precipitous fall in the saving-investment coefficient,9 the sample period
9 There are two other potential sources of differences from the results in Frankel
(1986): the U.S. Commerce Department released revised national accounts data for the
entire period in 1986, and we now use the dependency ratio as the demographic
instrumental variable in place of the ratio of the over-65 to the over-20 population. But the
years 1985-87 are indeed the source of the fall in the coefficient; when these three years are
omitted the coefficient is over 1 (as when the 1980s are omitted in Table 3).INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY    169
TabLe 3
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against National Saving.
1955-1987
CyclicaLly Adjusted Savings and Investment
Durbin-Watson Autoregressive
Constant Coefficient Statistic Parameter R2
1955-87 * -.06 .96 .25
(.25)
1956-87 * ,03 ,50 .42
(,26) (.15)
1955-79 -,68 1.37 1.61 .73
(,17) (,23)
1956-79 -.57 1,05 .35 .70
(.18) (.19) (.20)
1980-87 .39 .13 2.46 .30
(.36) (.17)
1981-87 .58 ,22 .34
(.37) (.16)
¯ Constant term is automatically zero




because cyclically adjusted rates are resLduals from a 1955-1987
is split at 1980. For the period 1955-79, not only is the coefficient
statistically indistinguishable from 1, but the point estimate is slightly
over 1.l° It is clearly the unprecedented developments of the present
decade that have overturned the hitherto robust saving-investment
relationship for the case of the United States. It is likely that financial
liberalization in Japan, the United Kingdom, and other countries,
continued innovation in the Euromarkets, and perhaps the repeal by the
U.S. Treasury in 1984 of the withholding tax on interest payments to
foreign residents, have resulted in a higher degree of capital mobility,
and thereby facilitated the record flow of capital to the United States in
the 1980s. But the magnitude of the inflow is in the first instance
attributable to the unprecedented magnitude of the decline in national
saving.
i0 If the 1956-87 sample is split at 1974, when the United States and Germany removed
capital controls, rather than at 1979, there is still a precipitous decline in the cyclically
adjusted saving-investment coefficient over time: from 0.87 (statistically, no difference
from 1) to 0.31 (borderline difference from 0). If the 1930-87 sample is split at 1958, when
many European countries restored currency convertibility, there is a small increase in the
coefficient over time: from 0.83 (statistically different from 1) to 1.14 (no difference from 1).
But this is no doubt because the saving and investment rates are not cyclically adjusted for
this period (the BEA series is not available back to 1930). Only when expressed on a
cyclically adjusted basis is the U.S. national saving rate of 1985-87 devastatingly low.170 Jeffrey A. Frankel
Differentials in Expected Rates of Return, and Expected Real
Depreciation
If the goal is to measure the degree of integration of capital markets,
rather than the degree to which decreases in national saving have
crowded out investment, then it is better to look at differences in rates
of return across countries rather than looking at saving-investment
correlations.11 But measuring real interest differentials will not do the
trick. An international investor, when deciding which country’s assets
to buy, will not compare the interest rates in different countries each
expressed in terms of expected purchasing power over that country’s
goods. When he or she thinks to evaluate assets in terms of purchasing
power, all assets will be evaluated in terms of the same basket, the one
consumed by that particular investor. The expected inflation rate then
drops out of differentials in expected rates of return among assets.
The differential in expected rates of return on two countries’ bonds
is the uncovered interest differential, the nominal interest differential
minus the expected change in the exchange rate: i - i* - (exp depr). If
asset demands are highly sensitive to expected rates of return, then the
differential will be zero, which gives us uncovered interest parity:
i - i* - (exp depr) = 0. (3)
To distinguish this parity condition, which is Criterion (III) above, from
the other definitions, it has often been designated "perfect substitutabil-
ity:" not only is there little in the manner of transactions costs or
government-imposed controls to separate national markets, but also
domestic-currency and foreign-currency bonds are perfect substitutes in
investors’ portfolios. Just as Criterion (I) is considerably stronger than
Criterion (II), so is Criterion (II) considerably stronger than Criterion
(III). For real interest parity to hold, one must have not only uncovered
interest parity, but an additional condition as well, which is sometimes
called ex ante relative purchasing power parity:
exp depr = exp infl - exp infl*. (2’)
~1 Measuring barriers to integration by difference in rates of return has the problem
that a given degree of integration can appear smaller or larger depending on the
disturbances to saving (or to other variables) during the sample period in question. (The
same is true of measuring by saving-investment correlations.) For example, the greater
degree of variability in the U.S. real interest differential in the 1980s, as compared to the
1970s or J_960s, should be attributed to the greater swings in variables such as the structural
budget deficit, not to a lower degree of capital mobility. (In any case, the degree of
variability in covered interest differentials is very low in the 1980s.) All we can say for sure
is that if the barriers to integration are essentially zero (the degree of capital mobility is
essentially perfect), then differentials in rates of return should be essentially zero.INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 171
Table 4
Purchasing Power Parity between the United States and the United Kingdom
1869-1987
1973-87 1945-72 1945-87 1869-1987








Regression Against Nominal Exchange Rate
Coefficienta
Autocorrelation Coefficient
* Significant at the 95 percent level.
Note: Standard errors are reported in p,~rentheses.
,120 ,074 ,110 ,093
.156 ,091 ,156 .121
,001 -.001 ,006* -.001"
(,01 O) (.002) (.002) (.000)
,687* .722* .830* .844*
(.208) (,130) (,092) (.O50)
.688* .730* .741" .838*
(.208) (.131) (.101) (.052)
2,516" 1,220" 1.687* .916"
(.417) (.103) (.186) (.093)
,959* .989* .992 ,988*
(.054) (.015) (.011 )    (.014)
a With constant term and correction for autocorrelation.
Source: Frankel (1989).
Equation (2’) and equation (3) together imply equation (2). If goods
markets are perfectly integrated, meaning not only that there is little in
the manner of transportation costs or government-imposed barriers to
separate national markets, but also that domestic and foreign goods are
perfect substitutes in consumers’ utility functions, then purchasing
power parity holds. Purchasing power parity (PPP) in turn implies (2’).
But as is by now well known, goods markets are not in fact perfectly
integratetl. Because of the possibility of expected real depreciation, real
interest parity can fail even if criterion (III) holds perfectly.
Table 4 shows updated annual statistics on the real exchange rate
between the United States and Great Britain. During the floating rate
period 1973-87, though there is no significant time trend, there is a large
standard error of 15.6 percent. The serial correlation in the deviations
from PPP is estimated at 0.687, with a standard error of 0.208. (The
equation estimated is (eft+1 - err+l) = AR(ert - ert), where er is the real
exchange rate, er is the long-run equilibrium level, alternatively esti-
mated as the sample mean or a time trend, and AR is the autoregressive
coefficient.) This means that the estimated speed of adjustment to PPP
is 0.313 per year, and that one can easily reject the hypothesis of
instantaneous adjustment.172 Jeffrey A. Franl~el
From the ashes of absolute PPP, a phoenix has risen. In response to
findings such as those reported here, some authors have swung from
one extreme, the proposition that the tendency of the real exchange rate
to return to a constant is complete and instantaneous, to the opposite
extreme that there is no such tendency at all. The hypothesis that the
real exchange rate follows a random walk is just as good as the
hypothesis of absolute PPP for implying ex ante relative PPP. But there
is even less of an a priori case why PPP should hold in rate-of-change
form than in the level form.
Even though ex ante relative PPP has little basis in theory, it does
appear to have some empirical support. Typically, the estimated speeds
of adjustment during the floating rate period, 0.31 in table 4 (1973-87),
while not so low as to be implausible as point estimates, are nevertheless
so low that one statistically cannot reject the hypothesis that the
autoregression coefficient is 1.0.
A 95-percent confidence interval on the autoregressive coefficient
covers the range 0.27-1.10. If the null hypothesis is an autoregressive
coefficient of 1.0, one cannot legitimately use the standard t-test derived
from a regression where the right-hand-side variable is the level of the
real exchange rate, because under the null hypothesis the variance is
infinite. There are a number of ways of dealing with this nonstationarity
problem. Here one simply applies the corrected Dickey-Fuller 95-
percent significance level, 3.00. The 0.31 estimate for the floating-rate
period is insignificantly different from zero. This failure to reject a
random walk in the real exchange rate is the same result found by Roll
(1979), Frenkel (1981, p. 699), Adler and Lehman (1983), Darby (1981),
Mishkin (1984a, pp. 1351-53), and Piggott and Sweeney (1985).
A more promising alternative is to choose a longer time sample to
get a more powerful estimate. Table 4 also reports statistics for the entire
postwar period 1945-87. PPP held better for the Bretton Woods years
than it did after 1973, as measured either by the mean absolute deviation
and standard deviation of the real exchange rate, or by the ability to
reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. But, despite the longer
time sample, one is only at the borderline of being able to reject the
random walk. The 95-percent confidence interval for AR runs from 0.64
to 1.02, and the t-ratio of 1.85 falls short of the Dickey-Fuller 95-percent
significance level of 2.93.
The standard error of an estimate of AR is approximately the square
root of (1 - ARa)/N. So if the true speed of adjustment is on the order
of 30 percent a year (AR = . 7), we would require at least 49 years of data
(2.932(1 - .72)/(1 - .7)2 = 48.6) to be able to reject the null hypothesis ofINTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 173
Dollar/Pound Real Exchange Rate
1869-1987, with Period Average
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AR = 1. It is not very surprising that 43 years of data is not enough,
much less the 15 years of data used in most studies.12
The last column of table 4 presents an entire 119 years of United
States-United Kingdom data, shown graphically as well in the figure.
With this long a time sample, the standard error is reduced consider-
ably. The rejection of no serial correlation in the real exchange rate is
even stronger than in the shorter time samples. More importantly, one
is finally able to detect a statistically significant tendency for the real
exchange rate to regress to PPP, at a rate of 16 per cent a year. The
confidence interval for AR runs from 0.75 to 0.94, safely less than unity,
and the t-ratio of 3.12 exceeds the Dickey-Fuller significance level of
2.89.
The motivation for looking at PPP in this section has been to obtain
insight into the expected rate of real depreciation, because that is the
variable that can give rise to real interest differentials even in the
presence of uncovered interest parity. In rejecting the random walk
description of the real exchange rate, one has rejected the claim that the
~2 An AR coefficient of 0.7 on a yearly basis corresponds to an AR of 0.97 on a monthly
basis (.9712 = .70). Thus it would take 564 months of data (2.932(1 - .972)/(1 - .97)2 = 563.7)
to be able to reject the null hypothesis of AR = 1. This is 47 years, very little gain in
efficiency over the test on yearly data.174 Jeffrey A. Frankel
rationally expected rate of real depreciation is zero.13 To take an
example, in 1983-84, when the dollar had appreciated some 30 percent
above its PPP value, survey data show expected future real depreciation
of 4.3 percent per year. It is thus not difficult to explain the existence of
the U.S. real interest differential, even without appealing to any sort of
risk premium. There is little excuse for authors such as Koraczyk (1985,
p. 350) and Darby (1986, p. 420) ruling out the possibility of expected
real depreciation a priori and thereby concluding that real interest
differentials necessarily constitute risk premiums.
If the failure of ex ante relative purchasing power parity could, in
itself, explain the failure of real interest parity, then it could also, by
itself, explain the failure of saving and investment to be uncorrelated. In
the recent U.S. context, a fall in national saving could cause an increase
in the real interest differential and therefore a fall in investment, even if
financial markets are perfectly integrated and even if the fall in saving is
truly exogenous, provided the real interest differential is associated with
expected real depreciation of the dollar.
Demonstrating that the failure of ex ante relative purchasing power
parity is capable of producing a correlation between saving and invest-
ment is, of course, not the same thing as asserting that this in fact is the
explanation for the observed correlation. Plenty of other competing
explanations have been proposed. But some support for the idea that
the existence of expected real depreciation is key to the observed
correlation comes from Cardia (1987). She simulates saving an~t invest-
ment rates in a sequence of models featuring shocks to fiscal spending,
money growth, and productivity, in order to see which models are
capable, for empirically relevant magnitudes of the parameters, of
producing saving-investment correlations as high as those observed. To
get at some of the explanations that have been most prominently
proposed, she constructs models both with and without purchasing
power parity, both with and without endogenous response of fiscal
policy to current account imbalances, and both with and without the
small-country assumption. The finding is that the model that allows for
deviations from purchasing power parity is able to explain saving-
~3 The rationally expected rate of real depreciation estimated from a specific time series
process is not necessarily the same as the actual expectation of real depreciation held by
investors. Frankel (1986, pp. 58-59) used survey data on expectations of exchange rate
changes (collected by the Economist-affiliated Financial Report) and forecasts of price level
changes (by DRI) to.compute a direct measure of expected real depreciation for the dollar
against five currencies. The numbers showed an expectation that the real exchange rate
tends to regress back toward PPP at a statistically significant rate of 8 to 12 percent a year.
The expectation of nominal depreciation back toward PPP is estimated more sharply at
12 to 16 percent a year in Frankel and Froot (1987). For a thorough rejection of the view that
investors’ expected exchange rate changes are zero, see Froot and Frankel (1989).INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY        175
investment correlations as high as one, while the various models that
impose purchasing power parity are generally not as able to do so.14
Covered Interest Differentials
The differential in real interest rates is defined as:
r - r* = (i - exp infl) - (i* - exp infl*).
We saw in the first section that real interest parity could hold, and yet
the saving-investment coefficient will be non-zero if other determinants
of investment are correlated with saving. We then saw analogously, in
the second section, that uncovered interest parity can hold, and yet real
interest parity will fail if there is a non-zero expected rate of depreciation
of the currency. Decomposing the real interest differential into the
expected rate of depreciation and the uncovered interest differential, we
have,
r - r* = (exp depr - exp infl + exp infl*) + (i - i* - exp depr). (4)
The sequence of logic is concluded by noting that covered interest parity
can hold, and yet uncovered interest parity will fail if there is a non-zero
exchange risk premium, defined as (fd--exp depr). The complete
decomposition of the real interest differential is:
r - r* = (exp depr - exp infl + exp infl*) + (fd - exp depr)
+ (i - i* - fd). (5)
The covered interest differential (i - i* - fd) is the proper measure of
capital mobility, in the sense of the degree of integration of financial
markets across national borders. It reflects such things as capital
controls, tax laws that discriminate by country of residence, default risk,
risk of future capital controls, transactions costs, and information costs.
Many studies have examined covered interest differentials for the
largest industrialized countries. Frankel and MacArthur (1988) give
references to those studies, and then look at differentials for 24 countries
vis-a-vis the Eurodollar market, for the period 1982 to 1987. Forward rate
data are used to decompose the real interest differential into the three
components shown in equation (5). Frankel (1989) adds a 25th country,
and updates the results through 1988. The results are similar. Although
14 Obstfeld (1986a) shows, in a life-cycle model of saving with actual OECD data on
the functional distribution of income and on population growth, that the coefficient in an
investment regression can be similar to those estimated by Feldstein and Horioka.176 Jeffrey A. Frankel
all 25 countries have real interest differentials that are substantial and
variable, 11 have quite small covered interest differentials: Canada,
Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan. These 11, and
the United States, may be said to have essentially open capital markets.
Their real interest differentials consist of some combination of exchange
risk premium and expected real depreciation, factors associated with the
currency in which the asset is denominated, rather than with the
country in which it is issued.
The case for highly integrated financial markets would appear to be
well established. But Feldstein and Horioka (1980, p. 315) argue that
financial markets are less well integrated at longer-term maturities, as
compared to the three-month maturities used in tests of covered interest
parity such as those reported above:
It is clear from the yields on short-term securities in the Eurocurrency market
and the forward prices of those currencies that liquid financial capital moves
very rapidly to arbitrage such short-term differentials .... There are, how-
ever, reasons to be sceptical about the extent of such long-term arbitrage.
Studies of international interest parity have been restricted by a lack
of forward exchange rates at horizons going out much further than one
year.15 But even without the use of forward rate data, there are ways of
getting around the problem of exchange risk. Data on currency swap
rates can be used in place of forward exchange rates to test the long-term
version of interest rate parity. Popper (1987) finds that the swap-covered
return differential on five-year U.S. government bonds versus Japanese
bonds averaged only 1.7 basis points from October 3, 1985 to July 10,
1986, and that the differential on seven-year bonds averaged only 5.3
basis points. The means mask some variation in the differential. A band
of 46 basis points is large enough to encompass 95 percent of the
observations for the five-year bonds; the band is 34 basis points for the
seven-year bonds. The means on five-year bonds for some other major
countries are as follows: Canada 15.9 basis points, Switzerland 18.7,
United Kingdom 51.1, and Germany 28.4.
is Taylor (1988) is one of the most recent of many studies of covered interest parity
within the London Euromarlcet. Such studies do not get at the degree of financial market
integration across national boundaries. When authors find deviations from covered interest
parity in such data, it is often due to low quality of the data, e.g., inexact timing. With
high-quality data, Taylor finds that covered interest parity held extremely well in 1985,
that it held less well in the 1970s, particularly during "turbulent" periods, that the
differential had mostly vanished by 1979, and that the differentials that do exist are slightly
larger at the longer-term than shorter-term maturities. But, like other studies, Taylor has
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The magnitude of these long-term differentials compares favorably
with the magnitude of the short-term differentials. The implication is
that Feldstein and Horioka are wrong in their conjecture that there is a
term-structure wedge separating national capital markets. At both long
and short maturities, the covered interest parity tests show a high
degree of financial market integration across national boundaries in the
late 1980s, even for countries that retained formidable capital controls in
the 1970s. 16 This conclusion is consistent with our earlier finding that the
U.S. saving-investment coefficient has fallen sharply in the 1980s.
Does High Capital Mobility Lead to Excessive
Exchange Rate Variability?
The first half of this paper was intended to establish that capital is
indeed highly mobile internationally, in the sense of integration of
financial markets across national borders. As we have seen, this fact
does not mean that real rates of return will necessarily be equalized
across countries, or that a saving shortfall in one country will be fully
financed in the form of a current account deficit of equal magnitude. But
it does mean that there are no significant barriers separating interna-
tional investors from the portfolios they wish to hold. Slight increases in
the expected rate of return on one currency, or any other source of an
increase in demand for the currency, will be instantaneously reflected in
the price of that currency on the foreign exchange market. This helps
explain why exchange rates have been so highly variable since 1973.
This half of the paper examines the question whether the high
degree of capital mobility might result in "excess volatility" of exchange
rates. Many practitioners believe that exchange rates are driven by
psychological factors and other irrelevant market dynamics, rather than
by economic fundamentals. Support seems to have grown in the 1980s
for "target-zone" proposals, the imposition of barriers to international
capital mobility, or other sorts of government action to stabilize ex-
change rates.17
Among American academic economists, a majority continue to
believe that exchange rate movements reflect changes in macroeconomic
~6 It is still quite likely, however, that there is a wedge in each country separating the
long-term interest rate from the after-tax cost of capital facing firms. Such a wedge could
be due either to the corporate income tax system or to imperfect substitutability between
bonds and capital. Hatsopoulos, Krugman and Summers (1988) argue that the cost of
capital facing U.S. corporations is higher than that facing Japanese corporations, even
when real interest rates are equal, because U.S. companies rely more heavily on equity
financing, which is more expensive than debt financing.
17 See, for example, Williamson (1985).178 Jeffrey A. Frankel
policy or in other real fundamentals, even if the fundamentals remain
unobserved by the econometrician.18 In this view, it follows that there
would be no advantage in attempting to suppress exchange rate
variability. But others support the position that exchange rates have in
some sense been more volatile than necessary.
Stabilizing and Destabilizing "’Speculators"
Those economists who believe that exchange rates have been
excessively volatile vary in their arguments. Some, like Tobin (1978) and
Dornbusch (1986), argue that exchange rates are too variable because
financial markets are "excessively efficient," that capital sloshes back
and forth among countries in response to trivial disturbances, and that
a tax on foreign exchange transactions would reduce volatility. But there
is another view, associated with McKinnon (1976), that exchange rates
are too variable because of a "deficiency of stabilizing speculation," in
other words because capital flows are not responsive enough to ex-
pected rates of return.
These two seemingly contradictory views can be reconciled. As-
sume two groups of participants in the foreign exchange market, whom
we will call "investors" and "spot traders," the first with regressive
expectations and the second with bandwagon expectations.
The investors can be thought of as "stabilizing speculators." When
the value of the domestic currency lies above its long-run equilibrium,
they expect it to depreciate in the future back toward equilibrium. If they
act on this expectation, they will move into foreign currency, driving the
price of the domestic currency down in the present. They thus act to
mitigate fluctuations of the currency around its long-run equilibrium.
The spot traders can be thought of as "’destabilizing speculators." When
the value of the currency has risen above its long-run equilbrium, they
expect it to continue to rise in the future. If they act on this expectation,
they will buy more of the currency, driving the price up further in the
present. They thus act to exacerbate fluctuations.
The reconciliation of the Tobin and McKinnon views is now
possible. When McKinnon says that exchange rates are too variable
because there is a deficiency of stabilizing speculation, he means that
there are not enough people of the first type, or their actions are
insufficiently responsive to their (stabilizing) expectations. When Tobin
18 Regression equations have been notoriously poor at using money supplies and
other economic fundamentals to explain exchange rate movements. So-called "variance-
bounds" tests purport to evaluate directly whether asset prices have been excessively
volatile. But if simple regression tests fail to identify an agreed-upon set of relevant
economic fundamentals, as they have in the case of exchange rates, then variance-bounds
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says that exchange rates are too volatile because there is too much
speculation, he means that there are too many people of the second
type, or their actions are excessively responsive to their (destabilizing)
expectations.
To write down the argument in symbols, assume that the spot rate,
s in log form, is determined by the ratio of the relative supply of
domestic assets, m in log form, to the relative demand for domestic
assets, d in log form:
s =m- d+ u, (6)
where u is an unknown error term. Assume that a fraction w of
participants19 in the foreign exchange market are investors and a fraction
1 - w are traders:
d =wdi+ (1- w) dt. (7)
Assume that the investors expect the exchange rate to regress toward its
long-run equilibrium value at rate 8, and that the traders expect it to
diverge, as along a "speculative bubble path," at rate ~:
exp depri -= 0(s - ~) (8)
exp deprt = -3(s - ~). (9)
Assume further that fi and ft represent the elasticity of each group’s
demand for foreign assets with respect to their expectations. The f
parameters can be interpreted as the degree of international capital
mobility, or substitutability, under definition III in the first part of this
paper. Then total demand for domestic assets is given by:
d=wfi0(s-~)- (1-w) ft3(s-~). (lO)
Solving for the spot rate gives:
s = {m + [-(1 - w)ft3 + (w)fi0] ~ + u}/{1 - (1 - w)ft3
+ (w)fio}.
Thus the variability of the spot rate is given by:
Var(s) = Var(m+u) / [1 + wfi0 - (1 - w)ft3]2.
(11)
19 To be more precise, we should define d to be the fraction of world wealth allocated
to domestic assets, and define w and 1 - w to be the shares of wealth held by the two
classes of market participants. Then s would be given by m - log(d/1 - d) + u.180 Jeffrey A. Frankel
For a given variance of money supplies (m) and other determinants (u),
the investors (i) act to reduce the variance of the exchange rate, and the
traders (t) to increase it. McKinnon’s position could be interpreted as
worrying that volatility is too high because fi, the responsiveness of
investors to their expectations, is too low, and the Tobin position that it
is too high because ft, the responsiveness of traders to their expectations,
is too high. The overall argument could also be stated alternatively: high
volatility stems from a low w, the number of investors relative to
traders. The argument would then belong to the chorus of popularly
voiced concerns to the effect that U.S. capital markets are hampered by
excessively short horizons,z°
In what follows we briefly do three things: (1) examine some
empirical evidence that these two classes of market participants do
indeed exist; (2) consider the question that occurs most obviously to
economists, why the destabilizing traders are not driven out of the
market; and (3) ask if a Tobin tax on transactions would be a solution to
excess volatility.
Survey Data on Short-Term versus Long-Term Expectations
Until recently, there were only two methods in use by econometri-
cians to measure exchange rate expectations. The econometrician either
used the forward exchange market, in which case the expectations were
measured with a possible error generally referred to as the exchange risk
premium, or used observed patterns in the ex post or realized spot rate
during a particular sample period, in which case the expectations were
measured with a possible error consisting of the forecasting errors that
happened to be made during that sample period. In either case, the
empirical literature followed most of the theoretical literature in making
an implicit assumption, that all participants in the foreign exchange
market held the same expectation.
By now, there are a number of regularly conducted surveys of the
forecasts of participants in the foreign exchange market. Such surveys may
measure expectations with error as the two already established techniques
do. But they can be argued to be a better way of getting at expectations, on
the grounds that the measurement error is smaller and less likely to bias
tests of the existence of such things as systematic expectation errors, the
exchange risk premium, and stabilizing speculation.21
20 For example, Hatsopoulos, Krugman and Summers (1988) argue that the discount
rate used by U.S. corporations to evaluate investments is too high.
21 The data from three surveys are analyzed in Frankel and Froot (1987) and Froot and
Frankel (1989). Dominguez (1986) has also used the MMS data. Froot and Ito (1988) have
recently analyzed extensively the data from a survey conducted in Tokyo by the Japan
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Working with the survey data forces one to confront the fact that
market participants do not all share the same expectations. The Econo-
mist survey, for example, reports a high-low range of responses which
for the case of six-month expectations averages 15.2 percent. The
dispersion of opinion reflected in the Money Market Services (MMS)
survey was particularly high in early 1985. This was precisely when the
dollar was peaking in value, and when a forecasting rule based on
regressive expectations would have given the answer (a future depreci-
ation back toward equilibrium) that most strongly contradicted forecast-
ing rules based on bandwagon or bubble expectations (continued
extrapolation of the past appreciation).
A pattern that emerges strongly from the survey data is that those
who forecast at relatively longer horizons tend to have regresSive
expectations as in equation (8), and those who forecast at shorter
horizons tend to extrapolate recent trends, or to have the bubble
expectations represented by equation (9). The Economist 12-month
forecasts, for example, show that for every 1 percent that the dollar has
appreciated above purchasing power parity equilbrium, survey re-
spondents forecast a future depreciation of 0.175 percent. (See table 4 in
Frankel and Froot (1988). The standard error is 0.0216. The sample
period is June 1981 to December 1985.) The opposite answer is given by
the MMS survey, which is conducted at shorter horizons and which
more directly covers foreign exchange traders. The MMS forecasts, for
example, show that for every 1 percent that the dollar has appreciated,
respondents forecast a further appreciation of 0.078 per cent over the
coming month. (The standard error is 0.013. The sample period is
October 1984 to February 1986.)22 Froot and Ito (1988) have found exactly
the same pattern in the Tokyo market participants’ responses to the JCIF
survey.
Why Isn’t There More Stabilizing Speculation?
Ever since Friedman (1953) pointed out that if speculators are
destabilizing then they must buy high and sell low, and therefore must
lose money and eventually drop out of the market, some economists
have tried to concoct elaborate counterexamples. The theory of rational
speculative bubbles, developed in its stochastic form by Blanchard
(1979), makes counterexamples easy. In a rational speculative bubble,
market participants lose money if they don’t go along with the herd.
22 In addition to regressive expectations of the form of equations (8) and (9), Frankel
and Froot (1987, 1988) also estimate adaptive and extrapolative expectations. The same
pattern emerges: "destabilizing" speculation at horizons of one week to three months in
the MMS survey, and "stabilizing" expectations at horizons of three months to one year
in the Economist and American Express surveys.182 Jeffrey A. Frankel
Recent theories feature a class of "noise traders" who engage in
activity that creates needless volatility and that thereby forces more
sensible traders to play a more restricted role in the marketplace. In
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1987), the noise traders are
unjustifiably optimistic about the risk/return tradeoff of the risky asset;
as a result, they take a larger share of the risky asset than do rational
risk-averse investors, and then prosper over time because the mean
return on their wealth is greater. In Frankel and Froot (1988), "funda-
mentalists" who forecast a return of the dollar to its fundamentals
equilibrium are assigned less weight by the aggregate marketplace each
period in which the dollar confounds their forecasts by appreciating
further from equilibrium; the dollar in turn appreciates further each
period in which portfolio managers place less credence in forecasts of
future dollar depreciation and therefore increase their demand for dollar
assets.
This section presents the outline of an argument why destabilizing
short-term spot traders have such a large role in the foreign exchange
marketplace and stabilizing longer-term investors have a relatively small
role. The argument is based on bank behavior. We set the stage with a
few facts about foreign exchange trading.
The volume of trading in foreign exchange markets is enormous. In
March 1986, transactions in the U.S. foreign exchange market (elim-
inating double-counting) averaged $50 billion a day among banks (up 92
pbrcent from 1983), and $34.4 billion among brokers and other financial
in~titu.tions. Most importantly, only 11.5 percent of the trading reported
by banks was with non-bank customers (of which 4.6 percent was with
nonfinancial customers). In London the total was $90 billion a day. Only
9 percent of the banks’ transactions were directly with customers.
Foreign exchange trading in Tokyo has grown so fast in recent years that
it is now thought to be about to surpass New York.23
Clearly, trading among themselves is a major economic activity for
banks. Schulmeister (1987, p. 24) has found that in 1985, twelve large
U.S. banks earned a foreign exchange trading income of $1.165 billion.
Every single bank reported a profit from its foreign exchange business in
every year that he examined.
Goodhart (1987, p. 25 and Appendix D) has surveyed banks that
specialize in the London foreign exchange market: "Traders, so it is
claimed, consistently make profits from their position-taking (and those
who do not get fired), over and above their return from straight dealing,
owing to the bid/ask spread"(p. 59). The banks report that their
specUiation (that is, taking an open position) does not take place in the
2a Economist, July 23, 1988. Sources for the other statistics, and estimates for other
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forward market (and only 4 to 5 percent of their large corporate
customers were prepared to take open positions in the spot market).
Apparently they consider the taking of long-term positions based on
fundamentals, or of any sort of position in the forward exchange
market, as too "speculative" and risky. Bankers recall the Franklin
National crisis and other bank failures caused by open foreign positions
that were held too long. But the banks are willing to trust their spot
exchange traders to take large open positions, provided they close most
of them out by the end of the day, because these operations are
profitable in the aggregate. (It is almost as if the banks do not realize that
a strategy of making a series of repeated one-day bets in foreign
currency is just as risky as a strategy of buying a portfolio of foreign
securities and holding them.) In the description of Goodhart, and others
as well, a typical spot trader does not buy and sell on the basis of any
fundamentals model, but rather trades on the basis of knowledge as to
which other traders are offering what deals at a given time, and a feel for
what their behavior is likely to be later in the day.
The reported profits are not so large that, when divided by the
volume of "’real" transactions for customers (for the U.S. market, 0.115
x $50 billion/day x 365 = $2 trillion/year), they need lie outside the
normal (small) band of the bid-ask spread. In other words, the profits
represent the transactions costs for the outside customers. One might
expect that this large volume of trading therefore cannot be relevant
from a larger macroeconomic perspective, that is, for understanding the
movement of the exchange rate. But this look at some of the mechanics
of trading does offer some inspiration for a possible model of noise
traders and why they prosper.
Consider the decision problem facing a bank executive who has
responsibility for two divisions: a foreign exchange trading room, staffed
by people who specialize in short-term trading, and an international
securities portfolio investment fund, where the people specialize in
longer-term investment. The question is how much of the banks’
resources the executive should assign to long-term investing versus
shorter-term trading. (We can think of this as determining the share w
in equation (7) above.) Note that, given the high hourly volatility in the
spot market, for a bank’s trading room to meet the foreign exchange
needs of customers necessarily entails placing risky bets on which way
the exchange rate will move in the time it takes to unload an open
position. As we saw in equation (11), the high volatility will follow from
a model in which insufficient weight w is given to the stabilizing
investors. The question is why w is not close to 1.
Assume that, within each profession, some people are better-
than-average at their job and others worse-than-average. The requisite
skills in the case of portfolio investing would include the ability to
evaluate, based on economic fundamentals, the longer-term determi-184 Jeffrey A. Frankel
nants of the exchange rate (as well as the determinants of prices of
various countries’ government bonds, private corporate bonds, and
equities). The requisite skills in the case of spot trading would include
the quick reflexes to act on new developments faster than others, the
stamina to work long hours without breaks (and, in a world of 24-hour
trading, to check positions regularly during the night), and the instinct
to know what other traders are going to do. (These skills are to a degree
reminiscent of those necessary to do well at video games.)
The only way the directors of the two bank divisions can assess and
reward the abilities of their employees is by means of their track records.
In the case of the foreign exchange trading room, the series of daily bets
placed over the preceding year constitutes a statistically significant
sample on which to evaluate whether a given trader has the requisite
skills, in which case she should be rewarded and perhaps allowed
increased discretion in her activities, or whether he lacks them and
should be let go.
In the case of portfolio investment, a year may not be long enough
to judge whether a given analyst is good or bad at picking currencies or
securities that are overvalued or undervalued. Given high short-term
volatility, many years of data may be necessary to discern statistically a
slowly disappearing mis-valuation in the marketplace (as Summers
(1986) has pointed out in the context of possible fads in the stock
market). Thus it may be perfectly rational for the bank executive to
restrict the size of the investment portfolio on the grounds of risk
aversion, and yet at the same time allow the spot traders to take a
sequence of large open positions.
Would a Tobin Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions Reduce
Volatility?
Tobin’s call for a small tax on all foreign exchange transactions, in
order to "throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient
financial markets," has been widely quoted. Dornbusch (1986) has
supported it, and Summers (1987) has suggested a similar turnover tax
to reduce volatility in the stock market. Some countries like Japan and
Switzerland have long had such a turnover tax and are considering the
possibility of abolishing it. Interestingly, when the argument is made in
these countries in favor of retaining the tax, it is almost invariably on the
grounds of raising tax revenue (from the wealth-owning class), rather
than on the grounds of reducing excessive market volatility.
To my knowledge, there has been little if any attempt to appraise
the Tobin proposal in the context of an appropriate macroeconomic
model. Equation (11), though extremely simplistic, constitutes such an
attempt. One can interpret proposals in general to decrease the degree
of international capital mobility as proposals to decrease the f parame-INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY    185
ters in the equation. The point is often made that there is no way of
discouraging "destabilizing speculation" without at the same time
discouraging international capital flows which are desirable for all sorts
of other reasons ("stabilizing speculation," international risk-sharing,
intertemporal consumption-smoothing and the like). But it is possible to
put a positive interpretation on the Tobin proposal in particular.
A small tax in proportion to the size of the foreign exchange
purchase will not be much of a deterrent to anyone contemplating the
purchase of a foreign security for longer-term investing.24 But it will
discourage the spot trader who is now accustomed to buying foreign
exchange with the intention of selling it a few hours later. If the
destabilizing speculators in equation (11) are indeed the short-term spot
traders that the expectations survey data suggest, and the stabilizing
speculators are the long-term investors, then the tax may indeed reduce
the volatility of the exchange rate. In other terms, it will reduce ft
without having much effect on fi. The turnover tax in this light is
crucially different from the taxes on international interest earnings that
were levied before 1973, by the United States to discourage capital
outflow or by Germany to discourage cap!tal inflow. Such taxes reduced
the rate of return to long-term investing just as much as the rate of
return to short-term speculation (perhaps more, if one considers that
capital gains from currency speculation were taxed at a lower rate than
interest earnings).
A favorable verdict on the Tobin tax is of course entirely dependent
on the assumed existence of destabilizing short-term speculators, which
remains unproven in the eyes of most economists. But there is in any
case another reason why the Tobin tax is unlikely to be a practical
solution to the problem of exchange rate volatility. The proposal does
get around the practical enforcement problem of trying to distinguish
between foreign exchange purchases for "speculative" purposes versus
purchases for the purpose of acquiring foreign goods or longer-term
securities (as under the "real demand rule" that governed forward
exchange transactions in Japan until 1985, for example). But the prime
reason Japan and Switzerland are debating the removal of their stock
market turnover taxes is the fear that Tokyo and Zurich are losing
business to other financial centers. In the modern technological and
economic environment, if the United States were to impose a tax on
foreign exchange transactions, the business would simply go to London
and Tokyo. If the G-10 countries were to impose the tax simultaneously,
then the business would go to Singapore, and so forth. Thus the Tobin
tax does not appear to be the solution to exchange rate volatility.
24 Dornbusch and Frankel (1988) show the expression for the incidence of such a tax
on short-term transactions.186 Jeffrey A. Frankel
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Michael P. Dooley*
Two important findings are reported in this paper. The first is that
the very large external deficit of the United States in recent years might
indicate a new era of capital mobility. Recent U.S. deficits are sufficiently
large to throw doubt on the view that shocks to savings and investment
ratios originating in the United States are bottled up. Frankel suggests
that a relaxation of capital controls outside the United States may explain
the transmission of savings investment shocks across industrial coun-
tries. If he is right, one of the dominant empirical regularities character-
izing the linkages among industrial countries has been altered.
The second finding, and the one I want to focus on, is the evidence
that real exchange rates change predictably over substantial time peri-
ods. This is an empirical regularity that opens up a whole new area of
research that might help us understand exchange rate behavior. It
should be recalled that the overshooting model developed by Dorn-
busch did not attract attention simply because it was theoretically
elegant, but because it offered an explanation for rational jumps in
nominal exchange rates following a monetary disturbance. In a similar
way, a theoretical explanation of relative price changes that "overshoot"
long-run equilibrium values might provide a basis for evaluating the
welfare implications of the changes in real exchange rates that have
characterized the floating rate regime. As Frankel points out in the
second half of his paper, proposals to reform the international monetary
system rest on the assumption that real exchange rate changes reflect a
failure of long-term stabilizing speculation or an excess of destabilizing
short-term speculation. But if the real exchange rate changes are a part
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of the adjustment to changing fundamentals, there is no presumption
that they reflect a failure of the present system. They may, instead, be an
integral aspect of an efficient adjustment mechanism.
It is often the case that specific economic interactions are best
identified in extreme circumstances. For example, the relationships
between money and prices and exchange rates are brought into sharp
focus during hyperinflations. In a similar way, the international debt
crisis provides an unfortunate laboratory for examining the behavior of
relative prices and real exchange rates.
In several cases, the real value of debtors’ exchange rates fell by
about half during 1982. (See the figure.) In the years that followed, this
reai depreciation has persisted. The obvious implications of the debt
crisis were twofold. First, it could be reasoned that the inability to
borrow would force governments of debtor countries to increase money
growth in order to increase inflation tax receipts. This could explain a
temporary fall !n the measured real exchange rate, but as prices started
to rise in the debtor country, this would be gradually eliminated.
The second effect, emphasized in Dooley and Isard (1986) and Isard
(1988) was that the debtor countries would be forced to adjust from a
situation in which foreign savings equal to about 3 percent of GNP
would b~ lost, and net service payments equal to 2 to 3 percent of GNP
would have to be made to nonresidents. The question then was whether
there was a sensible story that related the real exchange rate to the net
transfer of resources, as conventionally measured by the current ac-
count.
It is clear that there is no unique "reduced-form" relationship
between trade balances and real exchange rates. In a two-country
model, if residents of a debtor country consumed the same basket of
goods as residents of creditor countries and if current consumption in
creditor countries rose, then the same output would s!mply be con-
sumed by a different set of identical consumers at unchanged relative
prices.
The debate over whether real exchange rate changes would be a
part of the adjustment to a new current account pattern is an old and
important one. German reparations payments following World War I
raised the same issues. Would it have been necessary to lower the real
exchange rate in order to free domestic output for export in Germany
and to induce nonresidents to purchase it? This issue, which Keynes
identified as the "extra burden" of adjustment, was analyzed using the
standard trade theory. The theoretical results, then as now, were
inconclusive.
This is a very difficult problem because of the infinite variety of
ways ,that economic activity in both countries can be rearranged that
would result in a swing in current account positions. Income could
change relative to potential output in both countries, consumption andDISCUSSION 191
investment decisions could be altered, and so forth. It is clear, therefore,
that the implied change in the current account position was not a
sufficiently "structural" question to determine the direction of real
exchange rate changes.
Fortunately, another obvious empirical regularity exists in debtor
countries: because the government had to make the interest payments
on external debt, and because the government had been borrowing
abroad, it was clear that the fiscal status of governments of debtor
countries had deteriorated sharply in the summer of 1982. Perhaps this
was the key to "identifying" the exchange rate effects. An explanation
that seems promising is that the uncertainty surrounding the govern-
ment’s tax policy would provide a strong incentive for the private sector
to protect its wealth from the debtor government.
This, we conjecture, can only be accomplished by moving physical
assets out of the debtor country. We also reasoned that offering financial
claims to nonresidents in exchange for "safe" financial claims on
nonresidents would not reduce the risk of taxation, since this merely
shifts the risk of taxation from residents to nonresidents. The central
hypothesis that results from these observations is as follows.
The private sector of a country can protect its net worth from an
insolvent government only by net sales of goods and services to
nonresidents. Our definition of an insolvent government is crucial to the
argument. We view the existing tax laws as a contract between the
government and the private sector. The present value of the contract
depends upon its terms and expectations about the future income this
contract will yield to the government. If the present value of the existing
tax contract is less than the present value of the government’s obliga-
tions, including external and internal debt, defense expenditures and
the like, then we say that the government is insolvent. This is important
because such a government must be expected either to default on its
expenditure obligations or to default on its "tax contract" with the
private sector by increasing taxes on some segment of the private sector.
The second part of the hypothesis is that prices of goods and
services that can be removed from the potential tax base of the insolvent
government would instantly rise relative to prices of goods and services
that cannot be removed. An existing plant, for example, cannot easily be
picked up and exported to a safer environment. It does no good to ship
the stocks or bonds representing ownership of the plant. In a similar
fashion, the flow of certain types of output, haircuts, construction work,
or schoolteaching, cannot easily be shipped across international bound-
aries. This it seems to us, ensures that the relative prices of such
nontraded goods will fall relative to tradable goods in a country when
the government has recently become insolvent. Moreover, as these
"movable" or "tradable" goods are thrown into the safer country’s
markets, their price relative to nontraded goods in that market will fall.192 Michael P. Dooley
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Finally, we can translate changes in relative prices to chariges in the
nominal exchange rate given a monetary policy rule and the assumption
that prices of traded goods follow the law of one price.
An important aspect of this argument is that it does no good to
transport financial claims on immovable goods out of the debtor country
since the asset remained behind to be taxed or confiscated. The existing
literature on international capital flows has not fully come to grips with
the fact that cross-border exchanges of financial instruments are often
motivated by the desire to avoid taxes on holders of financial instru-
ments. In contrast, net capital flows across borders can be motivated by
the desire to avoid taxes on physical assets located in a country.
There has been tremendous volume of two-way trade in financial
capital among industrial countries. However, we regard this as largely
reflecting attempts to avoid taxation on financial intermediation, includ-
ing the taxes implicit in regulation of financial markets of industrial
countries, and attempts to avoid the monopoly "taxes" imposed by194 Michael P. Dooley
protected private financial intermediaries in industrial countries. This
admittedly stands the conventional interpretation of the development of
international financial markets on its ear. Taxes and regulatory con-
straints that fall directly on financial intermediation in industrial coun-
tries are regularly and successfully avoided by two-way trade in finan-
cial intermediation services across national borders.1 A by-product of
this is a huge volume of gross capital movements. But net capital
movements have been quite small, and when they are large, as they are
now for the United States, Germany, and Japan, the markets become
very uneasy.
The heavily indebted developing countries offer a striking example
of what a change in expected taxation of domestic capital can do. Before
1982, taxes on financial instruments were avoided by round-trip flows of
financial capital. At the same time, net capital inflows increased the
exposure of nonresidents to taxes imposed on physical capital located in
debtor countries. After 1982, round-trip tax arbitrage was greatly re-
duced for reasons discussed in Dooley (1988). But the threat of taxes on
net positions was sufficient to generate a net capital outflow and the
associated fall in real exchange rates.
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